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Articles 
DEFENDING THE PUBLIC GOOD AND 
TRADITIONAL SOCIETY:  NON-SCRIPTURAL 
RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS TO SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 
Donald H.J. Hermann∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The legal status of same-sex couples in the United States has 
changed dramatically over the last decade.1  A significant legal 
development affecting the recognition of same-sex marriages was the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in 2003, holding that state 
statutes prohibiting private consensual sex between adults, including 
adults of the same sex, were unconstitutional.2  In the same year, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that denying same-sex 
couples the right to marry violated the state constitution.3  The claim to a 
right of same-sex marriage, as well as registered domestic partnerships 
and civil unions, involves relatively new, and controversial, claims to 
legal recognition of same-sex relationships, or what some term “unions 
between homosexual persons.”4  This legal recognition has become a 
                                                 
∗ Donald H.J. Hermann is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at DePaul University.  
A.B. 1965, Stanford University; J.D. 1968, Columbia University; L.L.M. 1974, Harvard 
University; M.A. 1979, Ph.D. 1981, Northwestern University; M.A.A.H. 1995, School of the 
Arts Institute of Chicago; M.L.A. University of Chicago; M.A. Theology 2014, M. Div. 
(Cand.), Catholic Theological Union. 
1 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888–89 (Vt. 1999) (concluding that the Vermont 
Supreme Court was the first state court to hold that the state constitution required same-
sex couples to have all the rights and benefits of marriage); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Six 
Myths that Confuse the Marriage Equality Debate, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 103, 110 (2011); Lauren 
Gambino, Pennsylvania’s Same-Sex Couples Celebrate Right to Marry and Divorce, GUARDIAN 
(May 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/23/pennsylvania-same-
sex-marriage-divorce-governor-judge, archived at http://perma.cc/V67M-FC54.  As of 
January 6, 2014, thirty-six states recognize same-sex marriage.  Florida Joins the Wave on 
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/01/07/opinion/florida-joins-the-wave-on-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TP9J-8T5F. 
2 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 653, 578 (2003). 
3 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
4 See, e.g., id. at 980 (“Gay and lesbian couples living together openly, and official 
recognition of them as their children’s sole parents, comprise a very recent 
phenomenon . . . ”); see also Gary C. Furst, Will the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike 
Three Against Peremptory Challenges?, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 729 (1996) (“The Supreme 
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source of controversy in the general society, particularly in Europe and 
America.5 
Claims for recognition of same-sex relationships gave rise to 
significant discussions in various Christian denominations in the United 
States, including the Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church, and the 
Lutheran Church.6  It is, however, the Roman Catholic Church that 
provided the most significant challenge to same-sex unions.  Most of the 
early critiques of these relationships on religious grounds were based on 
                                                                                                             
Court has never held that the right to engage in a homosexual lifestyle is a fundamental 
right or that homosexuals as a group deserve special protections.”(citing Bowers v. 
Harwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986))). 
5 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE:  FOR BETTER OR 
FOR WORSE?  WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 5 (Oxford U. Press 2006) (“[T]he 
United States was not the only country in which the debate over same-sex marriage was 
taking place . . . gays and lesbians in Denmark and elsewhere in Scandinavia began their 
public campaign [in the 1960s] for the right to marry.”).  “Lesbian and gay Americans, their 
friends, and their families strongly support same-sex marriage, while a large number of 
traditional family value Americans are dead set against it.”  Id. at 13. 
6 See TO SET OUR HOPE ON CHRIST:  A RESPONSE TO THE INVITATION OF WINDSOR REPORT 
¶135, 25 (Episcopal Church Center 2005) [hereinafter TO SET OUR HOPE ON CHRIST] 
(expressing the view of the Episcopal Church); SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ISSUES OF 
CIVIL UNION AND CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 13 (Office of Gen. Assembly Presbyterian Church 
(USA) 2010) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ISSUES] (explaining the views of the 
Presbyterian Church).  The Episcopal Church believes that:   
For some time now, some members of our Church have been 
perceiving that same-sex relations as well as heterosexual relations can 
be manifestations of holiness, goodness, and enduring fidelity—just as 
same-sex relations as well as heterosexual relations can be 
manifestations of abuse, promiscuity, and many other kinds of sin. 
TO SET OUR HOPE ON CHRIST, supra, at 25.  The Presbyterian Church released an approved 
report stating that:   
We recognize that our interpretations of Scripture lead us to different 
conclusions regarding homosexual behavior and same-gender 
partnerships.  We hold that the Christian life is one of sanctification, 
and we confess that Scripture holds out a transforming hope of radical 
change in Jesus Christ that requires us to be dead to sin and alive to all 
that is good.  For some of us, that means same-gender couples should 
be encouraged to abstain from sexual relations; for others of us, that 
means that same-gender couples should be encouraged to enter into 
faithful, covenanted, lifelong partnerships. 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ISSUES, supra, at 13.  The Lutheran position was set out in Sex, 
Marriage, and Family:  A Contemporary Christian Perspective, where it is asserted that:  “[t]he 
Lutheran Church in American study affirms the traditional view of marriage as between 
one man and one woman is God’s intention.”  SEX, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY:  A 
CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 10 (Cedric W. Tilberg ed., 1970).  But see CHRISTIAN 
BATALDEN SCHAREN, MARRIED IN THE SIGHT OF GOD:  THEOLOGY, ETHICS, AND CHURCH 
DEBATES OVER HOMOSEXUALITY 147 (U. Press of Am. 2000) (“the burden of proof is on the 
[Lutheran] church to show why it should not support, encourage, and bless such 
covenantal unions [of gay and lesbian couples] as authentic embodiments of our best 
teaching on sexuality and marriage”). 
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Scriptural authority.7  The significance of the Roman Catholic arguments, 
discussed in this Article, is their basis primarily in natural law, a more 
philosophical or theological critique, which emphasizes biological 
complementarity and the proper end or purpose of sexual relations, and 
secondly, claims about the common good.  These arguments make a 
significant contribution to the general societal discussion of the claims of 
same-sex partners to recognition of their relationships; they also 
represent the most compelling contemporary religious objections to legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.8 
The courts and legislatures that addressed the issue of same-sex 
marriage expressed awareness of the importance of this issue to churches 
and other religious institutions.  For example, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in its Goodridge opinion observed:   
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral and 
ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to 
the union of one man and one woman, and that 
homosexual conduct is immoral.  Many hold equally 
                                                 
7 See PETER J. GOMES, THE GOOD BOOK:  READING THE BIBLE WITH MIND AND HEART 145 
(1996) (describing the view of those who condemn homosexuality).  A biblical based 
condemnation of homosexuality is often expressed this way: 
Nearly every such person who acknowledges an aversion to 
homosexuality does so on the basis of what he or she believes the Bible 
to say, and in their minds there is no doubt whatsoever about what the 
Bible says, and what the Bible means.  The argument goes something 
like this:  [h]omosexuality is an abomination, and the homosexual is a 
sinner.  At Sodom and Gomorrah God punished the cities for the sin of 
homosexuality.  Saint Paul and the early Christians were equally 
opposed to homosexuality, and homosexual practices are condemned 
in the New Testament church.  Therefore, if we are to be faithful to the 
“clear teaching of the scripture, we too must condemn homosexuality; 
it is the last moral absolute, and we compromise it at our own peril.” 
Id. 
8 See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH:  CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING 
PROPOSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 1 
(Pauline Books & Media 2003), available at http://www.clgs.org/files_clgs/article_ 
cdfconsiderations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9CLY-XL63 [hereinafter CDF, 
CONSIDERATIONS].  The CDF Considerations states: 
The present considerations . . . provide arguments drawn from 
reason . . . .  Since this question relates to the natural moral law, the 
arguments that follow are addressed not only to those who believe in 
Christ, but to all persons committed to promoting and defending the 
common good of society. 
Id.; see also Terence J. Lau & William A. Wines, Take Two Tablets and Do Not Call 
for Judicial Review Until Our Heads Clear:  The Supreme Court Prepares to Demolish 
the “Wall of Separation” Between Church and State, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 595, 610–11 
(2009) (“a number of religious groups do not view homosexuality as immoral or 
wrong”). 
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strong religious, moral and ethical convictions that 
same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that 
homosexual persons should be treated no differently 
than their heterosexual neighbors.  Neither view 
answers the question before us.  Our concern is with the 
Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance 
for every person properly within its reach.  “Our 
obligation is to define liberty of all, not to mandate our 
moral code.”9 
There is also awareness that some churches and religious institutions 
fear that legal recognition of same-sex marriage will result in their being 
required to participate in or otherwise sanction such unions.  The 
Supreme Court of California in its In Re Marriage Cases expressed an 
awareness of this concern; however, the court opinion maintained that 
recognition of same-sex marriage in state law did not impinge upon the 
religious belief or practice of any religious sect.  The opinion stated that:   
Finally, affording same-sex couples the opportunity to 
obtain the designation of marriage will not impinge 
upon the religious freedom of any religious 
organization, official, or any other person; no religion 
will be required to change its religious policies or 
practices with regard to same-sex couples, and no 
religious officiant will be required to solemnize a 
marriage in contravention of his or her religious 
beliefs.10 
Nevertheless, despite such assurance from judges and legislators that 
legal recognition of same-sex unions will not implicate churches or 
religious institutions, there continues to be significant opposition by 
religious authorities to state recognition of same-sex marriage.   
Various religious denominations initially based their opposition on 
an understanding that the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament’s 
condemned homosexuality and, by extension, condemned same-sex 
unions.11  Advocacy by religious leaders based on scripture, however, 
                                                 
9 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 653, 571 (2003), quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
10 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 451–52 (Cal. 2008). 
11 Religious condemnation of homosexuality has been based on several scriptural texts 
including:  Genesis, Leviticus, Corinthians, Timothy, and Romans.  Genesis 19:1–11 (New 
Century Version) (denouncing the sexual attacks on male visitors to Sodom); Leviticus 20:13 
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clashed with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
the establishment clause which imposes strict restriction on the use of 
religious authority as the basis for state law; any law which has a 
religious base must show a primary secular effect.12  This led religious 
critics of same-sex marriage to revise their arguments and cast them as 
claims that such laws violated the community moral sense.13  However, 
challenges to same-sex marriage laws as immoral became untenable as a 
result of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 
where the Court recognized the majority’s view that a practice is 
immoral is “not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice.”14 
                                                                                                             
(New Century Version) (“If a man has sexual relations with another man as a man does 
with a woman, these two men have done a hateful sin.  They must be put to death.”); 1 
Corinthians 6:9–11 (New Century Version) (condemning Sodomites); 1 Timothy 1:8–11 
(disapproving immorality with boys and men); Romans 1:22–27 (“[M]en stopped having 
natural sex and began wanting each other.  Men did shameful things with other men, and 
in their bodies they received the punishment for those wrongs.”); see also MARION L. 
SOARDS, SCRIPTURE & HOMOSEXUALITY:  BIBLICAL AUTHORITY AND THE CHURCH TODAY 23–
24 (Westminster John Knox Press 1955) (stating that the New Testament denounced 
homosexual activity). 
12 Stone v. Graham, 499 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).  The United States Supreme Court has 
grappled with the constitutionality of statutes that have a relationship to scripture and 
have established the requirement that any such law be a primary secular purpose.  Id.  The 
Court recognized the primary religious nature of the Bible in Stone v. Graham, when it 
found a state statute requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in each classroom 
unconstitutional.  Id.  The Court observed, “[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a 
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed 
secular purpose can blind us to that fact.  The Commandments do not confine themselves 
to arguably secular matters . . . .”  Id. (footnote omitted).  In School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp, the Court found unconstitutional a statute requiring the reading of 
passages from the Bible at the beginning of each school day.  374 U.S. 203, 203 (1963).  The 
Court noted that “[s]urely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be 
gainsaid . . . .”  Id. at 224.  In McGowen v. Maryland, the Court found constitutional a 
Maryland criminal statute known as Sunday Closing laws.  366 U.S. 420, 450–54 (1961).  
While recognizing the Scriptural basis of this legislation, the Court held that providing time 
for family activities, rest, and entertainment established a secular purpose.  Id. at 450.  So 
long as such laws were not used to coerce religious practice, the Court found them 
constitutional.  Id. at 454. 
13 See Robert P. George & Gerald V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 301, 301 (1995) (arguing that “homosexual sodomy, is intrinsically nonmarital and 
immoral”).  However, contraception is also non-marital and immoral, but the authors 
maintain that there is a significant distinction that justifies the state in not recognizing 
same-sex marriage.  Id.  See generally David L. Gray, 4 Reasons Why Artificial Birth Control is 
Immoral and Unnecessary, DAVIDGRAY (July 22, 2011), http://www.davidlgray.info/blog/ 
2011/07/four-reasons-why-artificial-birth-control-is-immoral-and-unnecessa/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZJV3-NQVQ (expressing arguments from Scripture for the reasons 
contraceptives are immoral). 
14 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
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Religious critics of same-sex marriage laws cannot effectively base 
their position on scriptural authority or an assertion of social 
condemnation of homosexuality as immoral.  There must be a showing 
of some significant social detriment resulting from same-sex marriage to 
justify withholding a claim to the right to marry.  This makes the 
arguments of the Roman Catholic Church significant since the teaching 
Authority or Magisterium of the Church asserts that its opposition is 
based not simply on scriptural authority or a religious view of morality, 
but concern for the common good and maintenance of a non-theistic 
understanding of natural law.15 
This Article will identify the most significant arguments developed 
by the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church in opposition to 
recognition of same-sex marriage, excluding those arguments based 
primarily on Scripture.  In addition to consideration of specific 
arguments addressed to same-sex unions, Part II provides consideration 
to the Church’s teaching on homosexuality, which underlies its position 
on the subject of same-sex marriage.16  Next, a review will be made of the 
arguments by traditionalist theologians and new natural law advocates 
who defend the Magisterium’s position.17  These include, for example, 
the importance of biological complementarity and the proper end or 
purpose of sexual relations and their relation to marriage as the basis for 
society.18  This will be followed by an examination of the revisionist 
theologians’ critique of the Magisterium’s position and the arguments 
they have developed in support of their acceptance of the claim for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.19  These include arguments based on 
an understanding of holistic complementarity, a naturalist 
understanding of homosexuality, and a broader and more empirically 
based understanding of the relationship between marriage and the 
                                                 
15 See C.J. McCloskey III, The Magisterium and Catholic Social Training, EARLY CHURCH 
FATHERS (Aug. 10, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://earlychurchfathers.wordpress.com/2014/08/ 
10/the-magisterium-and-catholic-social-teaching/, archived at http://perma.cc/6JW7-239B 
(explaining the Catholic Social Doctrine). 
16 See infra notes 49–80 and accompanying text (discussing two documents created by 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith). 
17 See infra notes 81–148 and accompanying text (analyzing the ideas and concepts of 
individuals such as John Finnis, John Paul II, Germain Grizez, David Avila, Robert Batule, 
Russell Shaw, and Stanley Kurtz). 
18 See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (stating that there are some who believe 
that procreation largely controls the boundaries for marriage). 
19 See infra notes 149–89 and accompanying text (providing criticism of the Magisterium 
from Daniel Maguire, Jack Bonsor, Todd Salzman, and Michael Lawler). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/8
2014] Defending the Public Good 7 
common good.20  Finally, a concluding assessment will provide the 
persuasiveness of religious based arguments for and against recognition 
of same-sex marriage.21 
II. TEACHINGS OF THE MAGISTERIUM 
A. Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions 
Between Homosexual Persons 
In 2003, the teaching office of the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (“CDF”), 
published Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions 
Between Homosexual Persons.22  While the primary focus of this Article is 
opposition to “recognition of homosexual unions,” the next section of 
this Article discusses the underlying, or more fundamental, concern with 
the morality of homosexual sexual acts.23  Part I of the CDF document, 
dealing with same-sex unions, argues that marriage by its nature is 
limited to a couple which is sexually or biologically complementary and 
whose sexual relations are open to procreation.24  By contrast, the CDF 
maintains that homosexual unions involving homosexual sexual acts are 
closed to the possibility of reproduction and “do not proceed from a 
genuine affective and sexual complementarity.”25  Later in this Article, 
consideration will be given to the opposing argument that biological 
complementarity and ability to procreate are not essential aspects of 
marriage or of the relationship properly understood for which legal 
recognition is being sought by same-sex partners.26 
The CDF warns in Part II of Considerations that not only should there 
be no legal recognition of homosexual unions, but that “de facto 
tolerance” of such unions compromises the public good by exposing 
young persons to mistaken ideas about sexuality.27  Moreover, the claim 
is made that same-sex couples cannot provide the home environment 
                                                 
20 See infra notes 174–76 and accompanying text (expressing the theory that 
homosexuality is not a chosen lifestyle, but is something that an individual will discover 
throughout his or her life). 
21 See infra notes 190–200 (concluding that the Magisterium fails to recognize the good 
that can be found from homosexual relationships). 
22 CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8. 
23 Id. (emphasis removed); see supra Part II.A (discussing the proposals which support 
homosexual unions). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the critics’ 
arguments against the Magisterium’s current view of homosexual relationships). 
27 CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
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most conducive to child development.28  The injury to the public good is 
a result of the misguidance of children by a bad example involving 
public recognition of the acceptability of homosexual acts.  Moreover, 
because children with same-sex parents are denied the appropriate and 
necessary influences for their psychological development, which occurs 
by having the contributions of both a male and a female parent.29 
Part III of Considerations sets out arguments against legal recognition 
of homosexual unions based on right reason, the biological and 
anthropological order, and the social order and the legal order.30  
Basically, the argument is that civil law cannot contradict right reason or 
the natural law and still have binding effect of obedience on the 
conscience of the citizen.31  Laws recognizing same-sex marriage violate 
the natural law because the effects of such civil laws are an assault on 
marriage as an institution resulting in an undermining of the common 
good.32  Primarily, this is because recognition of same-sex unions 
necessarily involves public validation of homosexual behavior.  The 
conclusion reached is that “[l]egal recognition of homosexual unions 
would obscure certain basic moral values and cause a devaluation of the 
institution of marriage.”33  The underlying premise is that the high status 
of traditional marriage is undermined by recognition of the alternative of 
same-sex marriage as its equivalent.  The argument is that traditional 
marriage is debased when same-sex marriage is accepted as its equal. 
The argument from right reason and natural law theory is rooted in 
the biological and anthropological view taken by Considerations:  (1) 
homosexual unions lack procreative capacity; (2) the use of artificial 
reproduction by homosexuals involves an affront to human dignity; and 
(3) such same-sex unions lack the conjugal dimension which enables 
transmission of new life and promotes mutual assistance.34  The raising 
of children by same-sex parents is viewed as necessarily harmful to such 
children.35  The absence of sexual complementarity is viewed as creating 
obstacles to normal development of children.36  The claim is that ideal 
heterosexual child rearing necessarily includes a male and a female 
component.  Consequently, adoption by same-sex persons is viewed as 
                                                 
28 Id. 
29 See id. (expressing the potential concerns with children who are not raised with both a 
mother and father). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 4. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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doing violence to children, because a same-sex parent environment is not 
conducive to proper human development, as a result of lack of either a 
male or a female element.  Later, this Article considers the contrary 
claims that children raised by same-sex parents suffer no detriment to 
their development or subsequent performance, as measured by 
researchers using tools of psychological and behavioral evaluation.37 
Considerations maintains that recognition of homosexual unions 
would radically transform the institution of marriage by separating 
procreation and the raising of children from the institution of marriage.38  
Of course, one response is that not all marriages do or can involve 
children.  For example, a marriage involving a sterile partner or a post-
menopausal wife are incapable of procreation, although marriages 
involving such a person are permitted by both civil law and Roman 
Catholic canon law.  Moreover, any couple can in fact incorporate 
children into their family by adoption or through the use of artificial 
reproduction technology.  Nevertheless, Considerations essentially 
maintains a definition of marriage as limited to a union of one man and 
one woman who have the potentiality to procreate through natural 
intercourse.39  The assertion is made that “[t]he inevitable consequence of 
legal recognition of homosexual unions would be the redefinition of 
marriage . . . .”40  Considerations avoids the charge that such a definitional 
argument by its nature is circular by additionally identifying the 
essential factors of openness to procreation and possible childrearing, 
which are both available only in a heterosexual marriage; same-sex 
marriages by their nature will be childless unless there is access to 
adoption or reproductive technologies.  Both of the latter means of 
establishing a family involving children are distinct from natural 
childbearing involving natural coital intercourse, which is impossible in 
the case of a homosexual union. 
Anticipating the charge that the opposition to recognition of 
homosexual unions involves a failure to extend civil rights to, and results 
in, discrimination against homosexual persons, Considerations explicitly 
rejects the claim of those urging homosexual union is required by respect 
for the autonomy of, and non-discrimination, against homosexual 
persons.41  The argument in Considerations is that homosexual unions are 
significantly distinguishable from traditional marriage so that it is not 
                                                 
37 See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying text (providing counterarguments to the 
idea that homosexual couples have a negative impact on the young children they are 
raising). 
38 CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 4. 
39 Id. at 2. 
40 Id. at 4. 
41 Id. 
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reasonable to claim that such unions are as equal to or the same as 
marriage, so as to require equal treatment.42  Some revisionist 
theologians discussed in this Article argue that there is, in fact, a basis for 
similarity between same-sex and heterosexual relationships in terms of 
sexual relationship, primarily as expressions of conjugal love and 
intimacy with the consequence that opposition to same-sex unions does 
involve discriminatory treatment of homosexual persons whose intimate 
sexual relations and commitment are treated differently than those of 
heterosexuals.43 
Considerations goes on to assert that since married couples contribute 
to the continued population of society, this makes it appropriate for the 
state to limit its recognition of the institution of marriage to the 
traditional heterosexual couple who are potentially capable of natural 
procreation.44  This makes heterosexual marriage foundational to 
traditional society.  Same-sex couples are incapable of making a 
contribution to the population through their sexual relations.  This view 
emphasizes the producing of children as the principal reason for state 
recognition of a marriage, rather than the establishment of the 
household, or a family, as an independent economic and social unit, 
which reduces the possible need for state paternalism which might 
otherwise be required by an ill or dependent individual, whether 
homosexual or heterosexual, who lacked the support resulting from a 
bond of mutual interdependence provided by marriage.  Nevertheless, to 
the extent that same-sex couples may legitimately claim any of the legal 
advantages of marriage resulting from state recognition of heterosexual 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 See infra notes 177–89 and accompanying text (discussing the teachings of Salzman 
and Lawler). 
44 CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 5.  The Court of Appeals of New York in 
Hernandez v. Robles upheld the favored treatment of opposite sex couples on the basis that 
natural intercourse between members of the opposite sex increase the likelihood of the 
birth of children who need care and that this justifies extending exclusively to their parents 
the right to marry.  7 N.Y. 3d. 338, 367 (2006).  The opinion of the court reads: 
The Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage does not 
apply with comparable force to same-sex couples.  These couples can 
become parents by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other 
technological marvels, but they do not become parents as a result of 
accident or impulse.  The Legislature could find that unstable 
relationship between people of the opposite sex present a greater 
danger that children will be born into or grow up in unstable homes 
than is the case with same-sex couples, and thus the promoting 
stability in opposite-sex relationship will help children more.  This is 
one reason why the Legislature could relationally offer the benefits to 
opposite-sex couples only. 
Id. at 359. 
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marriage, because they have established a household possibly including 
children, Considerations suggests homosexual persons can obtain the type 
of benefits available through marrying by the use of various provisions 
of the law dealing with the ownership of property (joint ownership), 
medical decision making and visitation (advance directives), and 
inheritance (wills).45   These legal provisions involve costs and other 
burdens for an unmarried couple.  Nevertheless, with such legal 
recourse available in the law, the argument is made that any charge of 
discrimination is mooted since the differences between heterosexual 
marriage and same-sex couples justifies the required use of different 
legal resources to vindicate the valid interests of the homosexual couple. 
Part IV of Considerations maintains that Catholics are obliged to 
oppose legal recognition of homosexual unions.46  Catholic politicians 
and lawmakers must vote against such legal recognition and seek repeal 
of such legislation if it has already been enacted.47  This exhortation 
raises issues about the role of conscience and whether the issue of same-
sex unions in fact implicates the common good in the way the Church 
teaches.  Nevertheless, Considerations takes the view that the common 
good requires the refusal to recognize same-sex unions.48 
B. Persona Humana and Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the 
Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons 
The key Magisterial document on homosexuality is the CDF’s 1986 
Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual 
Persons.49  This document reaffirmed and expanded the distinctions 
made earlier in the 1975 Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning 
Sexual Ethics:  Persona Humana between the homosexual condition and 
individual homosexual acts.50  Homosexual acts are said to be 
“intrinsically disordered” because they involve sexual acts which do not 
have the possibility of producing an offspring postulated as an essential 
                                                 
45 CDF, CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 8, at 5. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 6. 
49 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, ON THE PASTORAL CARE OF 
HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS AND NON-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 7 
(1998), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents 
/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-unions_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
7UHA-WUY2 [hereinafter CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS]. 
50 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON CERTAIN 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING SEXUAL ETHICS:  PERSONA HUMANA 9 (1977), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_do
c_19751229_persona-humana_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TRG5-FXBA 
[hereinafter CDF, PERSONA HUMANA]. 
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feature of the human sexual act.51  In the terms of Persona Humana, 
homosexual acts are viewed as disordered because they are deprived of 
their essential and indispensable finality of human sexual intercourse.52  
Of course, it may be argued in the alternative that sexual acts vary and 
have many dimensions but most significantly are expressions of love, 
intimacy, and commitment, and that the possibility of procreation is only 
one feature of sexual acts.  However, the Magisterium’s view is that 
openness to the possibility of procreation is a necessary element of any 
legitimate sexual act.53  Both human nature and sexual acts are to be 
understood in terms of fixed and permanent principles of natural law, 
where “limits [are] imposed by the immutable principles based upon 
every human person’s constitutive elements and [essential] relations.”54  
An alternate view of natural law emphasizes human development and 
social change and evolution as significant factors for an understanding of 
natural law that accommodates history and social evolution.55  This 
Article later discusses this view.56 
The Magisterium claims its approach is not only rooted in natural 
law but also has support from the natural sciences.57  In Persona Humana, 
sensitivity is shown toward the claim that, at least for some persons, 
homosexuality is not a matter of choice but a deep rooted condition 
which has likely genetic, psychological, or other foundational 
components.58  According to the Magisterium:   
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 6. 
54 Id. at 5. 
55 See JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY:  A STUDY OF THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC TRADITION 79–82 (1987) (discussing varying concepts arising from the theory of 
natural law). 
56 See infra notes 170–76 and accompanying text (discussing the evolutionary theory). 
57 See CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 7 (“[W]e will 
focus our reflection within the distinctive context of the Catholic moral 
perspective . . . which finds support in the more secure findings of the natural 
sciences . . . .”). 
58 See HOMOSEXUALITY:  SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 378–79 
(William Paul et al. eds., 1982) (summing up the conclusion made regarding 
homosexuality).  The Final Report of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues 
Task Force on Sexual Orientation concluded:   
While psychoanalytic concepts show considerable promise for the 
understanding of homosexuality’s interaction with other aspects of 
personality, other models (such as social psychological and 
developmental ones) also have much to contribute.  Biological models 
involving an interaction between genetic factors (that is, 
predispositions) and environmental ones are promising and require 
further study. 
Id. 
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A distinction is drawn, and it seems with some reason, 
between homosexuals whose tendency comes from a 
false education, from a lack of normal sexual 
development, from habit, from bad example, or from 
other similar causes, and is transitory or at least not 
incurable; and homosexuals who are definitively such 
because of some kind of innate instinct or pathological 
constitution judged to be incurable.59 
One might assume that the recognition of these differences between 
various homosexual persons would lead to a moral distinction that 
recognizes a significantly different behavior rooted in a deep innate 
unchangeable aspect of the human personality.  However, there is no 
distinction between these two classes of homosexual persons in the 
judgment of their acts.  Nevertheless, homosexual persons are offered 
pastoral care comprised of “understanding and sustained in the hope of 
overcoming their personal difficulties.”60  Despite the possibility of an 
innate genetic or biological basis for homosexuality, Church teaching 
holds that homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and can in no 
case be approved of, and “no pastoral method can be employed which 
would give moral justification to these acts on the grounds that they 
would be consonant with the condition of such [homosexual] people.”61 
The teaching of Persona Humana reiterates the central principle of On 
Pastoral Care, which states, “[a]lthough the particular inclination of the 
homosexual person is not a sin, it is a more or less strong tendency 
ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil [homosexual act], and thus the 
inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.”62  While this 
view does not judge the homosexual person as evil, it does seem to say 
that the person who is homosexual has an evil or sinful inclination.  
Moreover, it is noteworthy that not only does this view characterize 
human acts as evil, it collapses the distinction between ontic evil or pre-
moral evil and moral evil.  In the context of homosexual acts, ontic or 
pre-moral evil involves consideration of something objectionable (like 
cutting off an arm) which can only be judged as a moral evil by 
considering the context or circumstances (compare cutting off an arm as 
torture with an amputation to save a person’s life).  The view being taken 
in On Pastoral Care is that no matter what the context and no matter what 
the circumstances, homosexual sexual acts are to be considered as moral 
                                                 
59 CDF, PERSONA HUMANA, supra note 50, at 8. 
60 Id. at 9. 
61 Id.  
62 CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF THE HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 8. 
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evil.63  This view provides a major focus of criticism by revisionist 
theologians who have reflected on this statement and would distinguish 
ontic from moral evil in the case of homosexual acts occurring in 
circumstances such as a long term loving and committed relationship 
existing between same-sex partners, as opposed to homosexual acts 
outside of such a relationship. 
One of the purposes achieved by the publication of On Pastoral Care 
was to counter what was viewed as a too liberal interpretation of Persona 
Humana.  The Magisterium wanted to make it clear “lest [anyone] be led 
to believe that the living out of this orientation in homosexual activity is 
a morally acceptable option.  It is not.”64  While On Pastoral Care 
continues to rely on the Magisterium’s use of natural law to support its 
condemnation of homosexual acts, it gives significant attention to 
Scriptural treatment of the subject.65  While a consideration of arguments 
based on scripture are beyond the scope of this Article, it is noteworthy 
that there is explicit rejection of any new exegesis or use of the historical-
critical approach to interpretation of scripture which would assert 
anything other than an unbroken tradition of Scriptural condemnation of 
homosexuality. 
In addition to the natural law and Scriptural based analysis, On 
Pastoral Care invokes a sacramental understanding of marriage:   
To choose someone of the same-sex for one’s sexual 
activity is to annul the rich symbolism and meaning, not 
to mention the goals, of the Creator’s sexual design.  
Homosexual activity is not a complementary union, able 
to transmit life, and so it thwarts the call to life of that 
form of self-giving which the Gospel says is the essence 
of Christian [marriage].66 
There is a presumption that the homosexual is an individual whose 
experience is one of isolation who engages in self-regarding sexual 
activity.  By implication, this view of heterosexual union involves a very 
physicalistic understanding of self-giving in human relations since it 
postulates an act of sexual self-giving, which is authentic only in 
circumstances of genital unity with pre-creational possibility; it ignores 
the significance and possibility of psychological aspects of sexual self-
giving, including love and affection.67  The physicalist view taken here 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 10. 
66 Id. at 11. 
67 Id. at 12. 
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leads to the conclusion that the homosexual is incapable of a “self-
giving” same-sex relation, and instead is merely “self-indulgent” “when 
they engage in homosexual activity they confirm within themselves a 
disordered sexual inclination which is essentially self-indulgent.”68  
Moreover, the individuals who constitute the homosexual couple are not 
only self-indulgent, they are necessarily unfulfilled and unhappy “[a]s in 
every moral disorder, homosexual activity prevents one’s own 
fulfillment and happiness by acting contrary to the creative wisdom of 
God.”69  The conclusion is that homosexuals are incapable of a loving 
committed relationship with the possibility of personal and mutual 
fulfillment in their sexual relations.  This is the view that there is no such 
thing as an active, happy homosexual. 
In On the Pastoral Care, there is a denunciation of groups within and 
without the Church which try to pressure the Church “to accept the 
homosexual condition as though it were not disordered and to condone 
homosexual activity.”70  Not only are such influences condemned, but 
there is an effort to identify threats to the common good posed by 
homosexual acts.  First, “the practice of homosexuality may seriously 
threaten the lives and well-being of a large number of people.”71  This 
also seems to suggest that homosexuals spread disease and cause AIDS.  
Second, “[t]he view that homosexual activity is equivalent . . . of conjugal 
love, has a direct impact on society’s understanding of the nature and 
rights of the family and puts them in jeopardy.”72  This suggests that 
homosexuality is similar to lenient divorce laws in weakening the bonds 
of heterosexual marriage.  A similar argument is that same-sex marriage 
weakens marriage because it does not involve the aspect of natural 
procreativity.  Third, “to claim that the homosexual condition is not 
disordered [leads to] . . . other distorted notions and [sexual] practices 
gain[ing] ground.”73  This suggests the assertion that acceptance of 
homosexuality will lead to claims for acceptance of incest, polygamy, 
bestiality, and other forms of currently proscribed sexual practices.  This 
view was echoed by Justice Scalia, who wrote in his dissent in Lawrence 
v. Texas, that legal rejection of laws punishing homosexual acts will lead 
to legal recognition of their right to engage in other “immoral” sexual 
practices.74  Justice Scalia wrote:  “[s]tate laws against bigamy, same sex 
marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, 
                                                 
68 CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF THE HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 11. 
69 Id. at 12. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 13. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 14. 
74 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
Hermann: Defending the Public Good and Traditional Society: Non-Scriptural
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
16 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
bestiality and obscenity are likewise [behaviors] sustainable only in light 
of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.  Every single one of 
these laws is called into question . . . .”75 
Finally, expanding on the earlier discussion of homosexual 
orientation in Persona Humana, the issue is raised whether homosexual 
behavior is compelled or to be understood as being the result of human 
compulsion:   
What is at all costs to be avoided in the unfounded and 
demeaning assumption that the sexual behavior of 
homosexual persons is always and totally compulsive 
and therefore inculpable.  What is essential is that the 
fundamental liberty which characterizes the human 
person and gives him his dignity be recognized as 
belonging to the homosexual person as well.76 
Here there is a slight suggestion that homosexuality is a psychological 
condition subject to possible “cure.”  The psychiatric community 
challenges this view.77  The stronger suggestion is that homosexual 
persons have the ability to control their behavior by sacrifice and that 
abstinence is the moral choice that ought to be made; “[t]o refuse to 
sacrifice one’s own will in obedience to the will of the Lord is effectively 
to prevent salvation.”78  Finally, the Magisterium makes it clear that a 
person’s sexual orientation is an aspect of personality and not equated 
with the essence of the individual human person; the Church “refuses to 
consider the person as a ‘heterosexual’ or a ‘homosexual’ and insists that 
every person has a fundamental [human] identity.”79  Many would agree 
that sexual identity or sexual orientation does not capture the 
significance of the whole person.  Yet, the question remains whether 
sexual identity is a basic, significant, and perhaps essential aspect of the 
human person.80  By separating sexual orientation from human identity 
                                                 
75 Id. at 590. 
76 CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF THE HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 14–15. 
77 See Douglas C. Haldeman, Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy for Gay Men and 
Lesbians:  A Scientific Examination, in HOMOSEXUALITY:  RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY RESEARCH 149–60 (John C. Gonsiorek & James Weinrich eds., 1991) (discussing that 
even reparative therapists have conceded that their therapy rarely purges the patient of all 
homosexual desire, and there is no hard empirical evidence that it has any long-term effect 
on any patients). 
78 CDF, PASTORAL CARE OF HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS, supra note 49, at 15. 
79 Id. at 18. 
80 See Gregory Baum, Catholic Homosexuals:  The Self-Affirmation of Gay Catholics Raises 
Many Theological Questions, 99 COMMONWEAL 479, 481 (1974) (“[I]t is the task of men and 
women who discover a homosexual inclination in themselves to discern whether they are 
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and by separating sexual acts from a person’s identity, it is easier to 
maintain the act and status distinction which is at the heart of the 
Magisterium’s teaching about the appropriate separation of the 
homosexual condition, inclination or status, which is to be met with 
compassion from homosexual acts or behavior that is subject to 
condemnation. 
III.  NEW NATURAL LAW AND TRADITIONALIST SUPPORT OF THE TEACHING 
OF THE MAGISTERIUM 
A. New Natural Law Teaching on Homosexuality Opposed to Same-Sex 
Marriage 
John Finnis, a professor of law and legal philosophy at Oxford, 
provided a significant natural law analysis justifying the condemnation 
of homosexual acts, which supports the teaching of the Magisterium on 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage.81  Finnis adopts a non-theistic 
approach to natural law.  While natural law is used to support the 
religious objection to same-sex marriage, the natural law objection is not 
being presented as a religious objection. 
Finnis begins by asserting that the major Greek philosophers, 
including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle condemned homosexual conduct 
“as intrinsically shameful, immoral, and indeed depraved and 
depraving.”82  It is important for Finnis to establish an ancient Greek bias 
against homosexuality because of the close nexus between contemporary 
natural law theory and ancient Greek philosophy.  If Socrates engaged in 
homosexual acts, can it be asserted that such acts violate human nature 
since Socrates contributed to the bedrock of a non-theistic understanding 
of natural law? 
Finnis identifies three principal reasons for the Platonic-Aristotelian 
condemnation of homosexual conduct:   
(1) The commitment of a man and a woman to each 
other in the sexual union of marriage is intrinsically 
good and reasonable, and is incompatible with sexual 
relations outside of marriage.  (2) Homosexual acts are 
                                                                                                             
caught in a phase which prevents them from fulfilling their real possibilities, or whether 
homosexuality is a constitutive element of their personality structure.”). 
81 See generally John Finnis, Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1049–76 (1994) (examining the condemnation of homosexual acts). 
82 Id. at 1055.  Finnis equates the terms “homosexual activity,” “homosexual acts,” and 
“homosexual conduct” and defines them as referring “to bodily acts, on the body of a 
person of the same-sex, which are engaged in with a view to securing orgasmic sexual 
satisfaction for one or more of the parties.”  Id. 
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radically and peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason 
intrinsically unreasonable and unnatural.  
(3) . . . [H]omosexual acts have a special similarity to 
solitary masturbation, and both types of radically non-
marital act[s] are manifestly unworthy of the human 
being and immoral.83 
The positive support for marriage by the ancient Greeks include:  (1) 
valuing the “familiarity, affection[,] and love between spouses in a 
chastely exclusive marriage”; (2) a recognition of marriage as “an 
intrinsically desirable friendship between quasi-equals”; and (3) a view 
of marriage “as a union not of mere instinct but of reasonable love, and 
not merely for procreation but for mutual help, goodwill[,] and 
cooperation for their own sake.”84  These three values are not exclusive 
to heterosexual marriage, but are in fact the benefits sought by same-sex 
couples seeking to marry. 
The next issue for Finnis is to justify the exclusiveness of genital sex 
to marriage.  This involves recognition of the unitive nature of marital 
sex which simultaneously supports procreation and mutual love; 
“[g]enital intercourse between spouses enables them to actualize and 
experience (and in that sense express) their marriage itself, as a single 
reality with two blessings (children and mutual affection).  Non-marital 
intercourse, especially but not only homosexual, has no such point and 
therefore is unacceptable.”85 
Finnis draws on St. Augustine’s De Bono Coniugali to identify 
instrumental aspects of marriage, such as “procreation and education of 
children[,]” and non-instrumental aspects including:  friendship 
promoted by propagation, remedying the “disordered desire of 
concupiscence[,]” and the natural companionship of the two sexes.86  
This later effect of marriage gives legitimacy to sterile marriages and 
distinguishes them from same-sex unions.  Finnis asserts:  “in sterile and 
fertile marriages alike, the communion, companionship, societas and 
amicitia [of members of the two sexes]—their being married—is the very 
good of marriage, and is an intrinsic, basic human good, not merely 
instrumental to any other good.”87  Finnis’s discussion suggests that it is 
wrong to assert that procreation is the end to which marriage is 
instrumental, but rather “[p]arenthood and children and family are the 
                                                 
83 Id. at 1062–63. 
84 Id. at 1063. 
85 Id. at 1064. 
86 See Finnis, supra note 81, at 1064 (discussing St. Augustine views of marriage in De 
Bono Coniugali). 
87 Id. 
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intrinsic fulfillment of a communion which, because it is not merely 
instrumental, can exist and fulfill the spouses [in a special social sense] 
even if procreation happens to be impossible for them.”88 
Finnis comes to the central issue of whether sexual acts between 
same-sex partners can be legitimate expressions of non-marital 
friendship, love, and affection establishing the communion which he 
argues is fulfilling to spouses.  Finnis asks:  “[w]hy is the attempt to 
express affection by . . . non-marital sex the pursuit of an illusion?”89  
Finnis’ answer focuses on the biological reality of the union of the 
reproductive organs of husband and wife in forming a personal reality or 
a personal unit capable of reproduction and friendship.90  Without the 
relationship of marriage and without the complementarity of 
reproductive organs involved in intercourse, there is not only the 
absence of the personal unit, but the individuals are using their sexual 
organs merely for gratification:   
The union of the reproductive organs of husband and 
wife really unites them biologically (and their biological 
reality is part of, not merely an instrument of, their 
personal reality); reproduction is one function and so, in 
respect of that function, the spouses are indeed one 
reality, and their sexual union therefore can actualize and 
allow them to experience their real common good—their 
marriage with the two goods, parenthood and 
friendship.91 
On the other hand two persons who are good friends and cannot marry 
(i.e. the same-sex couples) who engage in sexual relations cannot have 
children together and “their reproductive organs cannot make them a 
biological (and therefore personal) unit.”92 
According to Finnis, since same-sex unions cannot experience the 
sexual act as a reproductive act, it is no more than an act of individual 
gratification:   
[S]exual acts [of same-sex partners] together cannot do 
what they may hope and imagine.  Because their 
activation of one or even each of their reproductive 
organs cannot be an actualizing and experiencing of the 
                                                 
88 Id. at 1065. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1066. 
91 Id. 
92 Finnis, supra note 81, at 1066. 
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marital good—as martial intercourse (intercourse 
between spouses in a martial way) can, even between 
spouses who happen to be sterile—it can do no more than 
provide each partner with an individual gratification.93 
Finnis limits the legitimate use of reproductive organs to realizing a 
marital relationship that is open to the common good of reproduction. 
Finnis characterizes sex relations between same-sex partners as 
reducing their bodies and reproductive organs to self-gratification and 
isolated selves rather than as a couple expressing mutuality of affection:   
For want of a common good [procreation] that could be 
actualized and experienced by and in this bodily union, 
that conduct involves the partners in treating their 
bodies as instruments to be used in the service of their 
consciously experiencing selves; their choice to engage 
in such conduct thus dis-integrates each of them 
precisely as acting persons.94 
Thus, Finnis ultimately denies that same-sex relations can involve 
mutuality of love, affection, and recognition of the other in their 
personhood.  Sexual acts of homosexuals are reduced to their physical 
character:   
[No matter the] thoughts of giving with which some 
same-sex partners may surround their sexual acts, those 
acts cannot express or do more than is expressed or done 
if two strangers engage in such activity to give each 
other pleasure, or a prostitute pleasures a client to give 
him pleasure in return for money, or (say) a man 
masturbates to give himself pleasure and a fantasy of 
                                                 
93 Id.  Finnis specifically rejects the claim that same-sex unions are open to procreation 
were conditions different in the same way sterile couples would accept offspring:   
Anal and oral intercourse, whether between spouses or between males, 
is not a biological union ‘open to procreation’ . . . .  Biological union 
between humans is the inseminatory union of male genital organ with 
female genital organ; in most circumstances it does not result in 
generation, but it is the behavior that unites biologically because it is 
the behavior which, as behavior, is suitable for generation. 
Id. 
94 Id. at 1066–67. 
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more human relationship after a grueling day in the 
assembly line.”95 
Finnis denies any significance to a homosexual’s possible loving and 
committed relationship, thus for Finnis, all homosexual sexual acts are 
reduced to solitary sexual acts:  “there is no important distinction in 
essential moral worthlessness between solitary masturbation, being 
sodomized as a prostitute, and being sodomized for the pleasure of it.”96 
Finnis concludes that only marital sexual acts are moral and such 
acts must be of the reproductive kind:   
[S]exual acts are not unitive in their significance unless 
they are marital (actualizing the all-level unity of 
marriage) and (since the common good of marriage has 
two aspects) they are not marital unless they have not 
only the generosity of acts of friendship but also the 
procreative significance, not necessarily of being 
intended to generate or capable in the circumstances of 
generating but at least of being, as human conduct, acts 
of the reproductive kind—actualization, so far as the 
spouses then and there can, of the reproductive function 
in which they are biologically and thus personally one.97 
The emphasis of Finnis on the unitive function of heterosexual marital 
intercourse, which he maintains must be open to the possibility of 
procreation, discounts the possibility of the unitive experience of most 
sexual acts and diminishes the significance of expressions of love, 
affection, and mutual self-giving that may occur in any sexual act.  
Instead, Finnis seems to emphasize physical aspects of heterosexual 
marital conjugal acts by essential coital relations, insemination, and 
conception.  Finnis’ account does not seem to coincide with the 
emotional and psychological aspects of “making love” by many married 
and unmarried couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual. 
B. The Theology of Sexual Difference Opposed to Same-Sex Marriage 
The new natural law theory primarily opposes same-sex marriage 
from the position that an openness to procreation is an essential element 
of marriage.  An alternative basis for opposition to same-sex marriage is 
the theology of sexual difference or sexual complementarity.  Pope John 
                                                 
95 Id. at 1067. 
96 Id. 
97 Finnis, supra note 81, at 1067. 
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Paul II provided significant support for this view in his Theology of the 
Body.98  According to John Paul II, “[t]he theology of the body, which is 
linked from the beginning with the creation of man in the image of God, 
becomes in some way also a theology of sex, or rather a theology of 
masculinity and femininity.”99  There are two important aspects of 
gender; these are the double aspects “of man’s somatic constitution ( . . . she 
is flesh from my flesh and bone from my bones)” and the meaning of the 
human body which attains completion in “reciprocal enrichment” through 
the relationship of the two sexes.100  This relationship of the two sexes in 
turn depends on sexual difference or “two incarnations” which involve:  
“two reciprocally completing ways of ‘being a body’ and at the same time of 
being human—as two complementary dimensions of self-knowledge and 
self-determination and, at the same time, two complementary ways of being 
conscious of the meaning of the body.”101 
It is the “presence of the feminine element, next to the masculine and 
together with it, [that] signifies an enrichment for man.”102  In marriage 
that sexual difference and complementarity is realized:  “masculinity and 
femininity, as that characteristic of man—male and female—that allows 
them, when they become one flesh, to place their whole humanity at the 
same time under the blessing of fruitfulness” which returns them “to 
[the] union in humanity . . . [that] allows them to recognize each other 
reciprocally.”103 
Germain Grisez developed the theology of the complementarity 
nature of female and male as a basis for understanding the nature and 
significance of marriage.104  Grisez developed a highly differentiated 
notion of sexual difference that underlies the concept of complementarity 
function in which “both sexes are naturally needed to fulfill 
complementary social roles.”105  This role differentiation is rather 
specific:   
[W]hile fathers should share in the care of their small 
children, the primary responsibility in this matter 
naturally falls to mothers; and while women can help 
                                                 
98 JOHN PAUL II, MAN AND WOMAN HE CREATED THEM:  A THEOLOGY OF THE BODY 165 
(2006). 
99 Id. 
100 See id. (quoting Genesis 2:23). 
101 Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 167. 
104 See generally GERMAN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, VOLUME TWO:  LIVING A 
CHRISTIAN LIFE (1993) (discussing the roles of men and women in society). 
105 Id. at 388. 
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deal with challenges which must be repelled by physical 
force, generally men are better suited by nature to 
organize such actions and execute them.106 
It is the view that essential sexual differences underlie the sexually 
differentiated roles which are central to the definition of marriage, as 
between one man and one woman:  “[t]his affirmation of the difference 
between men and women implies the legitimacy of sexually 
differentiated roles in marriage.”107  According to Grisez:  “[b]y 
differentiating the sexes, God plainly intends to differentiate the spouses’ 
roles” and “this natural differentiation serves the good of marriage and 
family.”108  The view that this difference in roles is rooted in “biological 
necessities” is at the heart of this argument:  “[n]ot only physiologically 
but psychologically, women naturally are adapted to this nurturing 
role.”109  This sexual difference does not only play a role in fulfilling the 
complementary nature of marriage, but is essential to proper and 
effective child rearing.110  Grisez does not deny a role for the male in 
child rearing, but sees it as complementary and additive:  “the 
development of children not only calls for the fulfillment of both roles 
but for their differentiation.”111  These roles involve both nurturing and 
challenging as “[b]oth parents can and should share to some extent in 
doing both things, but neither can do both fully at the same 
time[;] . . . the spouses must accept different responsibilities and carry 
them out consistently for the good of their children.”112  Nevertheless, 
even if it is important for parents to take on these differing roles, there is 
of course the possibility of meeting the needs of nurturing and 
challenging and being taken on by either of the partners to a same-sex 
marriage. 
The argument about sexual difference and its significance in the 
debate about same-sex unions is the subject of an article by Daniel Avila, 
the Associate Director for Policy and Research for the Massachusetts 
Catholic Conference in Boston.113  Avila notes that the California 
Supreme Court decision in 2008 recognized same-sex partners’ right to 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 617. 
108 Id. at 626. 
109 Id. at 627. 
110 GRISEZ, supra note 104, at 628. 
111 See id. (expressing that both parents have an important role in child rearing). 
112 Id. 
113 See Daniel Avila, Sexual Difference and Marriage:  An Urgent Need for New Studies, 9 
NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 441, 441–42 (2009) (discussing sexual differences and their 
relation to same-sex marriage). 
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state protected marriage because marriage “could not be limited by any 
reference to sexual difference.”114  The California court found that same-
sex family relationships are comparable in stature and equal in dignity to 
family relationships of opposite sex couples.115  The court found that a 
refusal to recognize a marriage “based on sex differences supposedly 
masks an unfairness and inequality,” because sexual difference of 
partners is irrelevant to marriage.116 
Avila argues that the California court was wrong in rejecting sexual 
difference as essential to marriage, but he admits that the defenders of 
Catholic doctrine, recognizing the significance of sexual difference, have 
not developed their argument by proof of the significance of sexual 
difference in the raising of children.117  According to Avila:  “[d]efenders 
of traditional marriage must be prepared to offer reasons why society 
must continue to recognize sexual difference as a fundamental attribute 
of marriage, argued in terms that carry authority and meaning in today’s 
post-Christian ethos.”118 
Avila makes clear that sexual difference is seen as a basic 
characteristic of marriage.  Pope John Paul II is cited for teaching that 
“the natural dimension of masculinity and femininity is crucial for 
understanding the essence of marriage.”119  Pope Benedict XVI is cited 
for the view that “marriage has a truth of its own[;] . . . the sexually 
different reality of the man and of the woman with their profound needs 
for complementarity, definitive self-giving and exclusivity.”120  
Moreover, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has provided a 
further reason for the requirement of sexual difference and 
complementarity in marriage:   
[T]he absence of sexual complementarity in these [same-
sex] unions creates obstacles in the normal development 
                                                 
114 See id. at 442 (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008)).  “This decision 
has been reversed by Proposition 8, a voter-initiated constitutional amendment that defines 
marriage as a union of man and woman, but leaves intact California laws granting equal 
recognition to same-sex relationships.”  Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 755 F.3d 
1193 (No. 14124), http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14-
124.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/Q38N-5BPT (setting out the proceedings for the 
pending case). 
115 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452. 
116 See Avila, supra note 113, at 442 (noting that sex differences are being used as a form of 
discrimination) (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452). 
117 Id. at 442, 444. 
118 Id. at 442. 
119 Id. (citing John Paul II, Address to the prelate auditors, officials and advocates of the 
Tribunal of the Roman Rota (Feb. 1, 2001)). 
120 Id. at 443 (citing Benedict XVI, Address to the members of the Tribunal of the Roman 
Rota (Jan. 27, 2007)). 
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of children who would be placed in these unions.  They 
would be deprived of the experience of either 
fatherhood or motherhood . . . [and] their condition of 
dependency would be used to place them in an 
environment that is not conducive to their full human 
development.121 
Avila maintains the argument that marriage demands sexual 
difference and complementarity cannot rest on the mere assertion that 
marriage is by tradition or definition between a man and a woman.122  
Rather, he claims there is a need to provide significantly more content to 
such terms as “masculinity, femininity, motherhood, fatherhood, 
complementarity, normal, and full human development.”123  Some of the 
questions that must be addressed include:   
Is the sex of an individual just an accidental feature in 
terms of its relevance to the institutional design, 
purposes, privileges, and benefits of marriage?  Or is 
there something uniquely substantial in sexual 
difference and in the love that arises from and is based 
on sexual complementarity that must govern policy and 
practice?124 
Avila concludes that the defenders of sexual difference need to do more 
“to identify and verify the defining traits of masculinity and femininity 
and, by extension, the essence of fatherhood and motherhood.” 125  This 
would seem to require empirical research, rather than mere assertion of 
tradition and presuppositions.  Avila admits that some critics argue that 
the theory of sexual difference is based on stereotypes, while other critics 
claim there is no difference between men and women beyond 
physiology.126  Yet, others claim love and not gender make relationships 
marital, or that physiological sex differences such as those involved in 
pregnancy are no more significant than other presumed differences that 
can give rise to the complementarity which forms the basis of same-sex 
relations that can qualify as marriage.127 
                                                 
121 Id. (citing Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals 
to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons (June 3, 2003)). 
122 Avila, supra note 113, at 444. 
123 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 445. 
127 Id. 
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C. Same-Sex Marriage is Contrary to the Common Good 
The concept of the common good is central to Roman Catholic Social 
teaching.128  The concept was implicitly acknowledged by Pope Leo XIII 
in his encyclical Review Novarum in 1891 and by Pope Pius XI in 
Quadragesimo Anno in 1931.129  Pope John XXIII gave explicit recognition 
to the concept in his encyclical Mater et Magistra in 1961 where the Pope 
stated that the government is justified in acting on behalf of the common 
good.130  In his encyclical Pacem in Terris in 1963, Pope John XXIII 
explicitly recognized that the common good is intimately tied to human 
nature.131 
Robert Batule, a professor of systematic theology at the University of 
the Immaculate Conception in Lloyd Harbor, New York, has argued that 
“[t]he common good is inexorably applicable to marriage and the 
family.”132  He maintains that the partners to a marriage merge their 
personal goods, and that the result is their personal goods in marriage 
are submerged in a contribution to “a common good.”133  According to 
Batule’s argument, “[a]n undeniable good of marriage is the children 
[that are begotten and raised] . . . establishing an especially important 
element of social posterity.”134  Batule goes on to argue that “the only 
                                                 
128 See J. MILBURN THOMPSON, INTRODUCING CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 59–60 (2010) 
(addressing the concept of the common good). 
129 See generally Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum:  Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor, 
VATICAN (May 15, 1891), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8VHA-9M7W (discussing the common good as it relates to Catholic 
teaching); Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno:  Encyclical on Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of 
the Social Order To Our Venerable Brethren, the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and 
Other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the Apostolic See, and Likewise to all the Faithful 
of the Catholic World, VATICAN (May 15, 1931), available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_ 
en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A3HV-7B6D (acknowledging the concept of the 
common good). 
130 See generally Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra:  Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on 
Christianity and Social Progress, VATICAN (May 15, 1961), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15 
051961_mater_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8TFV-Z2XA (calling the State to act for 
the common good). 
131 See generally Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris:  Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on 
Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, VATICAN (Apr. 11, 1963), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3TRC-VTXX (connecting 
the common good to human nature). 
132 Robert J. Batule, Defending Marriage:  How Faith and Reason are of the Same Mind, 66 
PRIEST 36, 41 (2010). 
133 See id. (discussing the common good in relation to marriage). 
134 Id. 
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origin that adequately safeguards children’s identity is the necessary, 
intimate, integral, mutual[,] and permanent union of spouses.”135  The 
assertion is that the heterosexual marriage which produces children is 
“the context which most readily provides emotional security and 
guarantees greater unity and continuity in the process of social 
integration.”136  Accordingly, other forms of the family unit are 
detrimental to child development:  “growing up in an intact two-parent 
family is an important source of advantage [for children].”137  
Batule maintains that same-sex couples are not capable of 
biologically producing children, although reproductive technologies, 
surrogates, or adoption can provide children for the same-sex couple.138  
Batule claims that such children raised by same-sex parents do not thrive 
to the same extent as children in traditional families and studies that 
claim otherwise are flawed.139  Batule argues that:  “children raised by a 
married mother and father fare better than children raised by same-sex 
partners[;] . . . [c]hildren do best when raised by their own married 
mother and father.”140  Batule concludes that the common good is best 
served by limiting marriage to the couple whose relationship is open to 
procreation, rather than accepting the concept of marriage as primarily a 
private, emotional relationship which he sees as the fundamental basis of 
same-sex partners claim to a right to marriage.141 
Russell Shaw, in An Argument Against Gay Marriage, goes farther 
than arguing heterosexual marriage is superior to same-sex marriage by 
asserting recognition of same-sex marriage will weaken heterosexual 
marriage:  “the case for legalizing gay marriage rests on the ideology of 
cultural relativism.  And this is an ideology whose principle practical 
effect is progressively to undermine and ultimately to dissolve social 
institutions and relationships based on ideas like ‘natural’ and ‘nature,’ 
‘true’ and ‘truth.’”142  The basic argument is that from the point of view 
                                                 
135 See id. (citing Pontifical Council for the Family, Family, Marriage, and De Facto Unions, 
30 ORIGINS 475–88 (2000)). 
136 Id. 
137 See id. (citing Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, 271 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 50, 80 (1993)). 
138 See Batule, supra note 132, at 41–42 (providing Batule’s theories on same-sex couples 
and children). 
139 Id. (addressing parenting in heterosexual families and the defects in studies regarding 
same-sex parents). 
140 See id. (citing Maggie Gallagher & Joshua Baker, Do Moms and Dads Matter? Evidence 
From the Social Sciences on Family Structure and the Best Interests of the Child, 4 U. MD. L.J. 174, 
174, 180 (2004)). 
141 Id. 
142 Russell Shaw, An Argument Against Gay Marriage, 80 COLUMBIA 19, 19 (2000). 
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of cultural relativism, marriage is a social construct open to alteration 
and reformulation:   
[I]t makes no sense to say, “A marriage is by nature a 
relationship between a woman and a man.”  The reason 
it makes no sense is that the idea of “nature” itself has 
no meaning.  “Nature” and “natural relationships” are 
words people use in speaking of certain social 
conventions.  There is no bedrock reality to which they 
refer.143 
Stanley Kurtz, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, does not 
disagree with Shaw that recognition of same-sex marriage threatens the 
social consensus on the morality of marriage.144  Kurtz writes:  “[g]ay 
marriage would set in motion a series of threats to the ethos of 
monogamy from which the institution of marriage may never 
recover.”145  However, Kurtz recognizes that the general abandonment of 
the taboo against homosexuality and the claims to personal freedom by 
homosexuals to the right to marry justify recognition of same-sex 
marriage; Kurtz concludes:  “I would rather accept some disruption in 
family stability than go back to the days when homosexuality itself was 
deeply tabooed.  The increase in freedom and fairness is worth it.”146 
Russell Shaw, however, argues that preserving traditional marriage 
is essential for the important goal of mentoring society and that “the best 
argument against legalizing same-sex marriage is the harm done to 
traditional marriage.”147  Shaw concludes:  “No-fault divorce provides 
the precedent here.  Changing the meaning of marriage to accommodate 
libertarian morality—which essentially is what happened on this case—
contributed to the weakening of traditional marriage visible in statistics 
in recent decades.”148 
Kurtz’s position seems to be based on the view that men are less 
monogamous than women, so that a marriage of two men would be less 
stable than a heterosexual marriage.  Of course by implication, a lesbian 
marriage would be the most stable.  Even if Kurtz is correct in his 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question:  Incest, Homosexuality, and Adultery, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE:  THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 265 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum 
eds., 2d ed. 2004). 
145 Id. at 268. 
146 See id. at 267 (discussing societal taboos surrounding marriage). 
147 Robert Shaw, Marriage and the New Morality, VIRTUEONLINE (Aug. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.virtueonline.org/marriage-and-new-morality-russell-shaw, archived at 
http://perma.cc/F9F7-MHBR. 
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assessment of male human nature, there is no evidence that marriage 
might not curb male promiscuity.  Moreover, there is no evidence that 
any instability in same-sex marriage would cause heterosexual husbands 
to wander. 
Shaw’s argument against same-sex marriage is based on the 
common good view of procreating and child rearing as the principle 
social benefit of legal recognition of the family unit.  Instead, it can be 
argued that the family, or household, forms the social bedrock of society 
because of the mutual dependence and responsibility of members of the 
family for each other.  Opposition to same-sex marriage preserves the 
status of isolated homosexuals which serves as a basis for the traditional 
criticism of homosexual acts.  Same-sex marriage creates a social relation 
in which the homosexual couple may experience monogamy, mutual 
love, affection, and support.  Same-sex marriages establish additional 
families providing for their members, including their children, reducing 
the need for social services and welfare, which would otherwise be 
required for individuals denied the opportunity to form family units. 
IV.  REVISIONIST CHALLENGE TO TEACHING OF THE MAGISTERIUM 
A. Challenge to Homosexuality as an Objective Disorder 
There is significant disagreement between the Magisterium and 
many contemporary Roman Catholic theologians on the subject of 
homosexuality.  Some theologians concede to the Magisterium’s teaching 
that heterosexual relations are normative, but urge an accepting pastoral 
approach for homosexual persons.149  Others suggest that the morality of 
sexual acts, whether heterosexual or homosexual, depends on the quality 
of the relationship between the sexual partners.150 
Some theologians suggest that homosexual relations are as normal as 
heterosexual relations.  For example, Daniel Maguire, a theologian 
teaching at Marquette University, argues that homosexuality is natural 
and “part of God’s plan for creation—some people are heterosexual and 
some are homosexual—this is the way God made us.”151  Similarly, 
“[t]he desire to bond lovingly and sexually with persons of the same sex 
                                                 
149 See generally Lisa Sowle Cahill, Moral Methodology:  A Case Study, in INTRODUCTION TO 
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 551–62 (Ronald P. Hamel & Kenneth R. Hines eds., 1989) (discussing an 
approach based on Christian ethics which provides an adequate Christian response to 
homosexuality). 
150 Gregory Baum, Catholic Homosexuals, 99 COMMONWEAL 479, 479–82 (1974). 
151 Daniel C. Maguire, A Catholic Defense of Same-Sex Marriage, RELIGIOUS CONSULTATION 
ON POPULATION, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND ETHICS (Apr. 20, 2006), 
http://www.religiousconsultation.org/Catholic_defense_of_same_sex_marriage.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VG35-69MH. 
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or of the opposite sex, is a fact of life, a fact of God’s creation, and we 
have no right to call it unholy.”152 
While acknowledging the condemnation of homosexual sex and 
same-sex marriage in documents issued by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, Maguire maintains that this teaching is wrong.153  
Maguire identifies three sources of church teaching, “or three 
“magisteria” of the Magisterium:  “the hierarchy, the theologians, and the 
wisdom and experience of the laity.”154  Maguire asserts that over the course 
of history each of these sources has erred.155  Today, Maguire argues, 
many theologians and a significant segment of the laity reject the Vatican 
teaching on homosexuality.156  Facing this disagreement Maguire 
maintains that one can invoke the tradition of Probabilism that provides:  
“[w]hen there is debate on a moral issue [such as same-sex unions, and], 
where there are good reasons and good authorities on both sides of the 
debate, Catholics are free to make up their own minds.”157  Maguire 
concludes that since condemning homosexuals to an involuntary life of 
celibacy would be cruel and absurd, it is reasonable to reject the 
Magisterium’s position on homosexuality.158 
Jack Bonsor, a lecturer in theology at Santa Clara University, engages 
the teaching of the Magisterium on homosexuality with a more nuanced 
argument.159  Bonsor begins with the presumption that sexual orientation 
is not chosen, but rather is a deep-rooted condition or instinct that is 
discovered.160  According to Bonsor, sexuality involves more than erotic 
passion, but also involves “friendship, intimacy, and romantic 
relationships.”161  Bonsor challenges the Magisterium’s judgment that 
homosexuality, or the homosexual inclination, is an objective disorder.162  
According to Bonsor, the Magisterium roots its view in the metaphysical 
anthropology of Thomas Aquinas.163  Aquinas sees the soul as the cause 
of “[h]uman sexual desire [when it] is directed toward the good of 
                                                 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id.  The “experience of the laity” is referred to in Latin as the sensus fidelium.  Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Maguire, supra note 151. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See Jack A. Bonsor, Homosexual, Orientation and Anthropology:  Reflections on the Category 
“Objective Disorder,” 59 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 60, 61–62 (1998) (proposing that Magisterium’s 
justifications are at odds with its conclusions regarding homosexuality and same-sex 
marriage). 
160 Id. at 60. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 61. 
163 Id. at 65–66. 
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human procreation.”164  In Aquinas’ view, this is true for all humans at 
all times because for every human being, the soul is the form of the body 
directly created by God.165  God’s direct action is not part of human 
development or evolution.166  Thus, for each person God directly creates 
and infuses a soul into the evolved human individual.167  The ordered 
soul possesses the natural inclinations such as the urge toward 
procreation.168  Bonsor identifies this as the theological ground for the 
Magisterium’s “universal claim that homosexual orientation is an 
objective disorder.”169 
While the Magisterium has embraced human evolutionary theory at 
the physical level, Bonsor argues that it maintains the view of “the direct 
creation of the soul” as part of its metaphysical anthropology.170  Bonsor 
points out that when considering homosexual orientation, the 
Magisterium’s view of evolutionary science is restricted by the 
metaphysics of direct infusion of the soul along with a literal 
understanding of Genesis, in which Adam’s sin directly affects human 
biology by producing the homosexual inclination infecting the directly-
infused soul.171  To the contrary, Bonsor argues that self-consciousness 
and thought evolve by similar natural processes as physical evolution.172  
Bonsor concludes:  “[i]f human nature evolves, perhaps homosexual 
orientation is a possibility served up by nature for human sexuality, 
intimacy, and love.  Perhaps homosexual orientation falls within divine 
providence, a providence that works within a cosmos wherein nature 
pursues multiple and diverse possibilities.”173 
Margaret Farley acknowledges that an understanding of 
homosexuality as an inborn characteristic, such as the evolutionary or 
adaptive feature recognized by Bonsor, has been an important reason for 
some religious traditions’ acceptance of homosexuals.174  Farley quotes 
one commentator:  “since homosexuality is not chosen, it cannot be 
immoral . . . [since] God would not demand of human beings something 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Bonsor, supra note 159, at 66. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 70. 
168 Id. at 66. 
169 Id. at 70. 
170 Id. at 71. 
171 Bonsor, supra note 159, at 72. 
172 Id. at 76. 
173 Id. at 79. 
174 MARGARET A. FARLEY, JUST LOVE:  A FRAMEWORK FOR CHRISTIAN SEXUAL ETHICS 294 
(2006). 
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they cannot possibly obey.”175  On the other hand, Farley wants to 
maintain that human sexuality is highly complex, takes a variety of 
forms, and that social justice demands respect for the way individuals 
realize their sexual orientation or preference.176 
B. Challenge to Procreation and Biological Complementarity as Necessary 
Elements of Marriage 
Some of the most sophisticated and compelling criticisms of 
Magisterial teaching on homosexuality and same-sex marriage are 
provided by Todd A. Salzman, a theologian teaching at Creighton 
University, and Michael Lawler, an Emeritus professor of theology at 
Creighton.177  Salzman and Lawler challenge the claim that procreation is 
an essential element of marriage, since children are a possibility and not 
indispensable consequence of marriage.178  Moreover, they maintain that 
sexual intercourse should not be viewed as exclusively for biological 
procreation, but also for expression of love and affection.179  Salzman and 
Lawler argue that even the teaching of the Magisterium has moved from 
the primarily procreative model of marriage to “a more personal model 
of conjugal love and intimacy.”180  According to Salzman and Lawler:   
                                                 
175 See id. (quoting Judith Plaskow, Lesbian and Gay Rights:  Asking the Right Questions, 9 
TIKKUN 31, 31 (1992)). 
176 Id. at 294–95. 
177 See generally Todd A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, New Natural Law Theory and 
Foundational Sexual Ethical Principles:  A Critique and a Proposal, 47 HEYTHROP J. 182–205 
(2006) (critiquing the foundational principles of The New Natural Law Theory and arguing 
alternative principles that would justify sexual acts of homosexual couples); Todd A. 
Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, Quaestio Disputata:  Catholic Social Ethics:  Complementarity 
and the Truly Human, 67 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 625–52 (2006) [hereinafter Quaestio 
Disputata] (discussing the types of complementarity that the Magisterium finds in a truly 
human sexual act); TODD A. SALZMAN & MICHAEL G. LAWLER, SEXUAL ETHICS:  A 
THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 155–90 (2012) [hereinafter SEXUAL ETHICS] (discussing the 
Bible, homosexuality, and the Magisterial teaching); TODD A. SALZMAN & MICHAEL G. 
LAWLER, THE SEXUAL PERSON:  TOWARD A RENEWED CATHOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY 214–35 
(2008) (analyzing an empirical theology approach to addressing traditional norms); Todd 
A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, Theology, Science, and Sexual Anthropology:  An 
Investigation, in TO DISCERN CREATION IN A SCATTERING WORLD 297–316 (Board of 
Ephiemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 2013) (evaluating the current situation of 
theological anthropology); Todd A. Salzman & Michael G. Lawler, Truly Human Sexual 
Acts:  A Response to Patrick Lee and Robert George, 69 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 663–80 (2008) 
(responding to Mr. Lee and Mr. George’s classicist approach to sexual norms and sexual 
orientation). 
178 See SEXUAL ETHICS, supra note 177, at 98 (“[C]hildren add nothing to that plentitude, 
except that they make the spouses father and mother.  Children are added to marriage as ‘a 
possible and not an indispensable consequence of marriage.”). 
179 Id. at 99. 
180 Id. at 102. 
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[Conjugal] love is uniquely expressed and perfected 
through the marital act [whether open to procreation or 
not].  The actions within marriage by which the couples 
are united intimately and chastely are noble and worthy 
ones.  Expressed in a manner which is truly human, 
these actions signify and promote that mutual self-
giving by which spouses enrich each . . . .181 
Salzman and Lawler directly address the requirement of sexual 
complementarity central to the CDF Considerations dealing with same-sex 
unions.182  Salzman and Lawler observe that the concept of 
complementarity has significance in two primary ways in the Magisterial 
teaching:  first, as biological complementarity including heterogenital 
and reproductive; and second, as personal and psychological 
complementarity.183  Salzman and Lawler observe:  “[t]he [M]agisterium 
condemns homosexual acts because they do not exhibit heterogenital 
and reproductive complementarities and, because they do not exhibit 
these biological complementarities, they are ontologically incapable of 
realizing personal complementarity, regardless of the meaning of the act 
for a homosexual couple.”184  Salzman and Lawler argue that 
heterogenital and biological complementarity may be features of a 
marriage, but are not necessary elements of a marriage.185  They maintain 
that “monogamous, loving, committed, homosexual couples . . . do 
experience affective and communion complementarity in and through 
their homosexual acts.”186  With this understanding of the legitimacy of 
non-procreative sexual acts and the essential interpersonal character of 
marriage, Salzman and Lawler find no persuasive argument against 
same-sex marriage.187 
The view of Salzman and Lawler that the Magisterium’s view of 
biological complementarity is essentially flawed is a logical conclusion 
from their premise that procreation is not an essential element of 
marriage.188  They argue that to the contrary:   
                                                 
181 Id. at 107. 
182 See Quaestio Disputata, supra note 177, at 627–29 (discussing three concerns found in 
Pope Paul II’s theology). 
183 Id. at 629–30. 
184 Id. at 644–45. 
185 Id. at 645–46. 
186 Id. at 645. 
187 Id. at 645–46. 
188 See Quaestio Disputata, supra note 177, at 646 (“Though they cannot exhibit genital 
complementarity homosexual individuals can exhibit the holistic complementarity.”). 
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[T]he needed complementarity for a truly sexual act 
[and marriage] is holistic complementarity that unites 
people bodily, affectively, spiritually, and personally in 
light of a person’s sexual orientation.  Heterogenital 
complementarity is needed for reproduction, but it is not 
needed for the sexual, affective, spiritual, and personal 
connection between two people that the recent Catholic 
tradition acknowledges as an end of marriage equal to 
procreation.189 
The complementarity which plays an important part in married life has 
psychological and social dimensions that are not dependent on genital 
difference or reflect social mandated stereotypes.  Homosexual couples 
express psychological and emotional differences which form the basis for 
their complementarity, while being committed to the same shared lives 
lived by heterosexual couples. 
C. Same-Sex Families, the Common Good, and Child Raising 
The Magisterium maintains that same-sex unions are detrimental to 
the common good primarily because same-sex parents deny children a 
developmental environment that includes both male and female parents.  
Stephen Pope, a professor of theology at Boston College, challenges this 
position.190  Pope objects to the CDF’s language in Considerations that 
states that the same-sex family does “violence” to the children in it 
because the environment is not “conducive to their full development.”191  
Pope maintains that this language involves distortion and “implies that 
foster parents, single parents, and parents with serious physical or 
psychological handicaps, no matter how hard they try, are guilty of 
inflicting ‘violence’ on their children since they, too, consent to raise their 
children under less than optimal conditions.”192 
Pope’s main argument is that the choice for many children is not 
between an environment with heterosexual rather than homosexual 
parents, but instead, between placement with a same-sex couple as an 
                                                 
189 Id. at 645–46. 
190 See Stephen Pope, The Vatican’s Blunt Instrument, CLGS (Aug. 9, 2003), 
http://www.clgs.org/resource-library/vaticans-blunt-instrument, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P8NX-LT9Q (“In the single most criticized claim in this document, the 
CDF holds that allowing children to be adopted by same-sex couples subjects them to 
‘violence,’ at least in the sense that it would not be ‘conductive to their full human 
development.’”). 
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alternative to an institution.193  Pope maintains:  “[t]he [CDF] document 
fails to give the slightest acknowledgement of the profound, long-lasting 
concrete good that is provided by some gay adoptive parents to their 
children.”194  According to Pope, the CDF fails to recognize the 
contribution to the common good resulting from “[an] adoption by a 
same-sex couple committed to providing a stable, loving[,] and 
respectful family environment for a child’s upbringing.”195 
The fundamental flaw in the Magisterium’s claim that same-sex 
parents are a detriment to their children is that it is not based on 
empirical evidence.  In fact, studies of children raised by same-sex 
parents have “failed to produce conclusive evidence that the children of 
lesbian mothers or gay fathers have significant difficulties in 
development relative to children of heterosexual parents.”196 
The early studies on same-sex parenting were subject to various 
methodological criticisms, including reliance on small and nonrandom 
samples, and researcher bias.197  However, more recent studies are 
considered scientifically valid; these studies test children directly, as well 
as relying on parent’s reports and evaluations from teachers.198  These 
studies reveal “no significant differences between children of lesbian 
mothers and children of heterosexual mothers in anxiety, depression, 
self-esteem, and numerous other measures of social and psychological 
adjustment.”199  To date, those studies recognized as scientifically valid 
have revealed no differences between children reared in same-sex couple 
households and those reared in heterosexual households in the level of 
cognitive functioning, the level of parental investment in children, and 
other indicators of well-being.200 
                                                 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
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196 Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults:  A Social 
Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 191, 197–98 (1995). 
197 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 833, 844–52 (1997) (critiquing studies with results favoring same-sex parent 
because of methodological flaws). 
198 See generally Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of 
Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 175–76 (2001) (providing data and conclusions of the 
studies). 
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V.  CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT OF THE TEACHING OF THE MAGISTERIUM ON 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX UNIONS 
The Magisterium’s teaching recognizes homosexuality as a sexual 
orientation and a possible deep rooted condition.  Thus, this 
understanding of homosexuality suggests it is not a matter of choice of 
sexual partners or choice of lifestyle.  However, the view that is taken of 
homosexuals and homosexual acts is limited to the individual person 
who, for the most part, is viewed as seeking personal gratification from 
sexual acts.  There is an explicit view of homosexual acts as necessarily 
solitary and non-unitive.  There has been, however, a significant change 
in society that now accepts homosexual couples enjoying a life of 
intimate association based on love, affection, and mutual support.  
Homosexual sex acts take on a new meaning when considered as 
expressions of the love, affection, and support of sexual partners, rather 
than isolated acts of homosexual persons. 
Once one recognizes that homosexuality involves a deep-seated 
aspect of the person and personality, it makes no sense to criminally 
prosecute the conduct that is an expression of the personality.  It also 
questions whether the expression of such a personality characteristic in 
conduct in an intimate relationship should be considered immoral.  
Moreover, when homosexual acts are seen as expression of inter-
personal intimacy, rather than acts of personal gratification, one can see 
validity to a claim that the varying inter-personal relationships should be 
recognized as moral.  Even if one continues to maintain the position that 
homosexuality is a disorder and that the homosexual act is an ontic or 
pre-moral evil, it would seem appropriate to consider the content and 
circumstances of the homosexual act as an expression of the 
monogamous commitment of love, affection, and support between the 
members of the homosexual couple, so that a homosexual act ultimately 
can be viewed as moral. 
This Article examined the Magisterium’s arguments against same-
sex unions that are based on understandings derived from moral 
theology and anthropology, but did not closely examine religious 
arguments based on Scripture or sacramental belief.  I would maintain 
that the Magisterium’s non-Scriptural arguments against the state 
recognizing same-sex unions by extending civil marriage to homosexuals 
are not persuasive.  Challenges to these claims have been set out in this 
Article’s commentary on the Magisterial documents and in the review of 
revisionist theologians’ arguments. 
The objective of the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church in 
publishing Consideration Regarding Proposals to Give Recognition to Unions 
Between Homosexual Persons was to provide a convincing, non-scriptural 
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argument that would persuade the rational legislator or judge to reject 
claims for access to same-sex marriage.  These arguments depend on 
psychological and anthropological assumptions that are open to 
reasonable debate.   
The Magisterium’s teachings reveal a limited understanding of the 
meaning of sexual relations in contemporary life, take the view that 
homosexuality involves an isolated individual seeking experiences of 
personal gratification, and adopts an understanding of gender roles as 
stereotypical and traditional.  Ultimately, the Magisterium’s position on 
same-sex marriage depends on premises about genital complementarity 
between the sexes which provides the possibility of procreation and 
gender complimentarity that facilitates childbearing.  Those premises are 
subject to the convincing criticism that they involve a restricted 
physicalistic understanding of sexual relations, gender stereotyping, and 
an excessively limited view of the nature of intimate sexual relationships.  
The Magisterium’s arguments cumulatively fail to establish a compelling 
foundation for opposing legally recognized same-sex marriage.  As a 
result of the church’s views that sexual acts in a marriage involve mutual 
love and support, and since canon law does not prohibit sterile persons 
from marrying, the Magisterium implicitly recognizes that the ability to 
procreate is not an essential factor of marriage; thus the persuasiveness 
of the Magisterium’s argument against legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage is further undermined by its own teaching.  Ultimately, the 
Roman Catholic Church Magisterium’s failure to recognize that today 
many same-sex parties express a committed, monogamous, and loving 
relationship, and often form a family with children contributing to the 
common good; this fact further undermines the Catholic Church’s 
opposition to legal recognition of same-sex marriage.   
Recognition of same-sex marriage would further the state’s interest 
in establishing families and households that facilitate individual 
members providing for each other out of love and commitment to 
mutually care  for each other.  The common good is served by reducing 
the likelihood of society’s need to care for those who would otherwise 
become dependent and require public support.  Moreover, legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage can provide such families social 
support and access to legal and community resources important for 
caring for and educating children and for facilitating the mutual support 
of the individuals who have joined themselves together in a loving 
relationship.  The common good is furthered by the establishment of the 
household resulting from legal recognition of same-sex marriages 
involving loving partners, often raising children, producing families 
committed to mutual support, and affectionate caring for each other. 
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